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This paper assesses the likely impact on the agricultural sector of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries of the Harbinson modalities, along with 
the EU and US proposals as alternative scenarios in the context of the ongoing 
negotiations of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Impacts are assessed on a 
number of indicators, notably government revenue, producer, consumer and total 
welfare measures and trade flow. Reflecting country- and commodity-specific factors, 
the three modalities have different impacts on the indicators. The SADC as a whole is 
found to lose in terms of total welfare under all three proposals. But while this loss 
under the Harbinson and EU proposals is due to declines in consumer surpluses and 
government revenues, reduced producer surplus and government revenue explain the 
loss in total welfare under the US proposal. Thus, the ranking of the modalities differs 
according to the impact indicator used, revealing important trade-offs in the choice of 
the modalities. An issue raised is the value of consumer gains relative to producer 
gains for low-income economies highly dependent on agriculture because for them 
effective demand for consumption itself depends on incomes generated from increased 
agricultural activities, which in turn requires sustained gains in producer surpluses. 
The paper presents a range of results and discusses the trade-offs, with the hope that 
SADC trade negotiators and policy makers find these to be useful as they negotiate for 




The first half of 2003 was a crucial period for the ongoing agricultural 
negotiations in the WTO. The Chairman of the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture (CoA) released a draft negotiating modalities in February 2003 
and a revised version in March 2003. No agreement was reached on the 
modalities by then and in the subsequent months, as well as at the Cancun 
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FAO, Rome. E-mail addresses: Daneswar.Poonyth@fao.org; Ramesh.Sharma@fao.org. 
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WTO Ministerial in September 2003. Some negotiators complained that the 
modalities on the table were too “ambitious” while others said that the reform 
proposals were not ambitious enough. In view of this, there is a heightened 
interest among all those involved in the negotiations, directly or indirectly, on 
likely impacts of the modalities. Of particular concern is the impact on 
developing countries, as the Doha Round is also called a “development” 
round. One way to make progress in the negotiations is to understand the 
implications of the proposals, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
 
To this end, the main objective of this paper is to quantify the likely impact of 
the negotiating modalities on the agricultural sector of SADC countries, 
focusing on the Harbinson revised draft modalities of March 2003, on the EU 
and US proposals as alternative scenarios. This work is also a contribution to 
the new and growing literature on model-based assessments of the impact of 
the Doha Development Round of reform proposals. These other works 
include Freeman et al (2000), Diao et al (2001), FAO (2002), FAPRI (2002), 
OECD (2002), Vanzetti and Sharma (2002), Vanzetti and Peters (2003) and 
Poonyth and Sharma (2003). 
 
The paper consists of six sections. Following this introduction, Section II 
presents, very briefly, an overview of the SADC countries followed by their 
main trade concerns. Section III introduces the ATPSM model, including 
sources of data and parameters, and coverage of countries and commodities. 
Next, Section IV summarizes negotiating modalities and presents the three 
scenarios simulated. Section V presents simulation results while section VI 
concludes. 
 
2.  OVERVIEW OF THE SADC ECONOMY AND CONCERNS ON 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
2.1  Overview of the economy 
 
SADC was formed in 1992 and currently consist s of 14 membe r countries, 
which together comprise a total population of approximately 200 million 
people. The total SADC GDP was around US$182 billion in 2000, with average 
GDP  per capita of US$1,761 (World Bank, 2002). There is a considerable 
heterogeneity among the SADC members. Thus, for example, seven of them 
are least-developed countries or LDC (Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia). The rest are 
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developing countries, with South Africa considered to be a borderline case.3 
South Africa is also the largest economy and has large manufacturing sectors 
along with Zambia and Zimbabwe. Most SADC countries are also food deficit. 
Three countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and 
Tanzania) account for almost two thirds of the total population (64%) while 
the six smallest members (Seychelles, Swaziland, Mauritius, Botswana, 
Namibia and Lesotho) make only 4%.  
 
Agriculture is the most important sector for many SADC countries from 
various standpoints. Although the sector’s contribution to the GDP varies 
widely (from 3% for South Africa to 58% for Tanzania), some other 
contributions are significant, e.g. as a source of foreign exchange, government 
revenue, employment (highest, with the exception for South Africa and 
Botswana). Thus, in the context of discussions on the impact of trade 
liberalization, it is important to keep in mind these features of the agricultural 
sector. In particular, the sector is the main source of livelihood for the majority 
of the population, especially in rural areas. Also important to note is the 
predominance of small farmers who are relatively vulnerable to external 
shocks. Agriculture in the region is also highly dualistic with large-scale 
commercial farms operating side by side with small, family farms, a structure 
that matters in discussing the impact of trade liberalization. 
 
2.2  Issues at stake in trade negotiations 
 
There are some general issues or concerns that apply to all SADC members, as 
with all developing countries, while others are specific to particular countries 
or country groups. One general concern is that while these countries 
themselves grant little or none of the trade-distorting domestic subsidies, they 
feel that they are affected negatively by subsidies granted by developed 
countries.4 Thus, on the whole, the position is that there are significant gains 
t o  b e  m a d e  f r o m  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  t r a d e - distorting domestic subsidies in the 
developed countries. This also follows from the fact that the SADC countries 
are considered to be natural low-cost producers of farm products. Similarly, a 
much stronger arguments are made against export subsidies. 
 
 
3 Note that there is no “official” definition of a developing country in the UN or other system. 
In the ongoing WTO negotiations, South Africa is seen as a developed country. FAOSTAT 
classifies South Africa as a developed country, while for the World Bank it is a lower middle-
income country. 
4 Some WTO Members, in their expressed positions, feel differently, i.e. they feel that reduced 
subsidies by OECD countries raise world food prices and increase import bills. This is 
covered later. 
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Market access, the third pillar of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (UR AoA), perhaps attracts the most attention of the developing 
countries, and indeed rightly so, as improved market access provides direct, 
tangible benefits. In this area, the three main difficulties discussed are tariff 
peaks and escalation in developed country markets (OECD, 1997; OECD, 
2001; Lindland, 1997), and high tariffs in many other developing country 
markets. The key negotiating positions call for sharply reducing the tariff 
peaks and tariff escalation, a legacy of the tariff cutting formula of the UR.5 
Although tariffs on most tropical products are relatively low, it is often 
forgotten that the developing countries also produce and export temperate-
zone products in significant amounts.  
 
In addition to these common interests, there are also some significant 
divergences of concerns and positions among the SADC members, which 
have led them to join different groupings and alliances in the WTO 
negotiations. Thus, for example, South Africa has supported the freer-trade 
position of the Cairns Group in several areas, while Mauritius is an active 
party to the so-called grouping of “friends of multifunctionality”, at the same 
time speaking on the cause of Small Island Developing States or SIDS. Some 
others belong to the group of Net Food-importing Developing Countries or 
NFIDC (Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and Seychelles) that are concerned 
with the possibility of negative effects in terms of higher food import bill 
following trade liberalization. Most SADC members also receive preferential 
access for their exports, (e.g. under the Cotonou Agreement) and are worried 
that further reduction of the Most Favoured Nation (m.f.n.) tariffs would 
reduce this advantage. Finally, many countries, notably the LDC, are worried 
about lower tariff revenues once their own tariffs are reduced.6  
 
In summary, these are some of concerns that are widely shared by all or most 
SADC members, and others that apply to particular groupings and alliances. 
The AoA package consists of many trade policy instruments, which at times 
tend to work in different directions. For example, reduced tariffs should 
expand exports on the positive side, but these also could raise food import 
bills on the one hand and reduce export earnings, as preferential tariff 
margins shrink, on the other. Though models are often criticized for not being 
 
5 See Table III.2 in WTO (1999) for reduction rates. Some of the reduction rates could be 
misleading. For example, tariffs on tropical products were reduced the most but from a very 
low base (e.g. 5–10%). Its effect on trade would be much less than, say, 26% reduction of a 
tariff from a very high base. 
6 Yet another important country grouping is the Southern Africa Custom Union or SACU 
formed by Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa, and has common 
external tariffs. 




                                                
realistic, there is no other way to quantify the effects of some the many 
different reform proposals within a common framework. 
 
3.  THE ATPSM MODEL 
 
Developed jointly by UNCTAD and FAO, the Agricultural Trade Policy 
Simulation Model (ATPSM) is a global trade model designed primarily for 
simulating agricultural trade policies in the context of the WTO AoA. The 
advantage of this model over most other models is that it covers virtually all 
countries, including LDC. It is also flexible in that a user can define his/her 
own groups of countries (e.g. SADC) and commodities (e.g. cereals).  
 
3.1 Model  characteristics 
 
The ATPSM is a comparative-static, synthetic, multi-commodity, multi-region, 
partial-equilibrium world trade model for agricultural products. It accounts 
for the distribution of quota rents, solves for equilibrium world market prices 
and their impact on domestic production and trade flows. It covers 161 
countries (160 individual countries and one EU-15) which can be grouped as 
desired for the purpose of measuring impacts. For example, in an earlier work 
(Poonyth & Sharma 2003), countries were grouped into three categories: 42 
LDC represented in the model; rest of the 99 developing countries; and 20 
developed countries. In this paper, results are shown separately for all SADC 
countries as well as for SADC total. The model is also fairly comprehensive in 
its commodity coverage, a total of 36 commodities.7 All policy instruments are 
defined in ad-valorem equivalent terms. Thus, specific tariffs are converted to 
ad valorem rates and both domestic and export subsidies are similarly 
expressed in their respective ad-valorem equivalents. 
 
Production (domestic supply) and demand depend linearly on domestic 
prices. Imports clear the market. The world prices are linked to domestic 
prices by price transmission equations; transmissions are assumed to be 
complete. Both demand and supply specifications account for cross-effects. 
Demand function for country r and commodity i is expressed as:  
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7 Despite the fact that the model covers 36 commodities, it is possible that some important 
commodities for some countries are excluded, for example wines for South Africa. See Table 1 
for the commodities covered. 




Domestic supply for country r and commodity i is similarly expressed as 
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The import and export functions are expressed as  
i r i r i r i r i r i X S S D D M ∆ + − = ∆ , , , , , ˆ ˆ  (3)   
 
r i r i r i S X , , , ∆ = ∆ γ  (4)   
 
Where: 
D, S, X, and M denote demand, supply, exports and imports, respectively: ^ 
denotes a relative change and ∆ absolute changes, Pw is world price, tc is 
domestic consumption tariff and tp is domestic production tariff,ε  is supply 
elasticity, η is demand elasticity, γ is the ratio of export to production and i, j 
are commodities indexes while r is a country index. Domestic price is a 
function of the world market price and policy variables, e.g., support 
measures, tariffs, subsidies and quotas. 
 
Trade revenue and welfare effects are computed based on volume responses 
(i.e.  ∆X,  ∆M,  ∆S and ∆P) and price changes. The trade revenue effect of a 
policy change is derived for each country and commodity as follows: 
 
() ( ) () [] ( ) ) ( M X P M M X X P P R w w w − − ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ + = ∆  (5) 
 
Total welfare TS is the sum of producer surplus (PS), consumer surplus (CS) 
and net government revenue (NGR), i.e. ∆TS = ∆PS + ∆CS + ∆NGR. The 
change in CS also takes into account the change in the quota-rent received. 
Quota rents, U, are computed for each country and commodity as the product 
of import volume and world price, times the difference in in-quota and out-
quota tariffs, i.e., 
 
) ( 1 2 m m w t t QP U − =   (6) 
 
Where: 
 Q denotes the import quota, Pw the world price, tm1 and tm2 are in-quota and 
out-quota tariffs (or applied rates if lower). Rent accrues only if the importing 
country is applying the out-quota tariff. The capture rate, c, is the proportion 
of the rent captured by exporting producers as opposed to the proportion, 1-c, 
going to the importing country. The change in the quota rent received, c∆U, is 
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added to the PS. For each country and commodity, changes in the PS and CS 
are defined as: 
 
() [] U c S S P PS d p ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ 5 . 0  (7) 
 
() [] d c D D P CS ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ 5 . 0   (8) 
 
Change in net government revenue (∆NGR) includes a change in tariff 
revenue, change in export subsidy expenditure, change in domestic support 
expenditure and change in quota rent not received by exporters. Formally, 
∆NGR = ∆TR - ∆ES - ∆DS + (1-c)∆U, where TR is tariff revenue, ES is export 
subsidy expenditure, DS is domestic support expenditure and (1-c)∆U is 
change in quota rent forgone. 
 
The model generates outputs in terms of changes in both quantities and 
percentage changes from the base period for the following variables: 
•  Quantities - production, consumption, imports and exports 
•  Trade values - export, import, and net trade balance 
•  Welfare measures – Producer surplus, Consumer Surplus, Net government 
revenue and Total welfare 
•  Prices - world market prices, and wholesale (consumer) and farm prices 
 
3.2 Data  source 
 
The model is based on data from various sources. Production, consumption, 
exports and imports (in metric tons) are from FAOSTAT8. All prices are 
expressed in US dollars. The base period for the model is 1998-2000 for 
production, imports, exports etc. while tariffs and other policy parameters are 
based on the final year of implementation of the UR AoA (2000 for developed 
and 2004 for developing countries). In-quota tariffs, out-quota tariffs and 
global quotas are from the AMAD9 database and were aggregated to the 
ATPSM commodity levels. UNCTAD COMTRADE10 is the main source for 
bilateral trade flows while applied tariffs are from the TRAINS11 database. 
Model parameters are assembled from several sources, but mainly from the 
FAO World Food Model. 
 
                                                 
8 FAOSTAT: FAO Data Base. 
9 AMAD: Agricultural Market Access, http://www.amad.org/. 
10 COMTRADE: http://unstats.un.org/. 
11 TRAINS: http://r0.unctad.org/. 
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3.3 Model  limitations 
All commodities are assumed to be tradable, i.e., there is no independent 
behaviour for domestic prices, and homogeneous, i.e. there is perfect 
substitution among goods produced in different countries. There are no other 
domestic policies besides Amber Box subsidies. The model does not account 
for the possibility of countries exerting market power, though it is well known 
that international trade of several agricultural products is often concentrated 
in a small number of companies. Being a comparative static model, other non-
price factors in both supply and demand sides are not captured. Finally, there 
is no income variable in the model.  
An important assumption is that within-quota tariffs are not relevant even 
where quotas are unfilled.12 This means that the out-quota tariff or the applied 
rate, whichever is operative in a particular situation, is the key determinant of 
domestic prices. Where in-quota rates are the relevant determinants of 
domestic prices, this assumption would overstate the benefits of liberalization. 
The ATPSM does account for preferential market access (e.g. EU-ACP and 
EBA) with the exception of the AGOA. The model however does not account 
for trade diversion in the context of regional or preferential trade 
arrangements. Bilateral quotas are allocated by a complex procedure based on 
each country's import and export shares in the base period. Quota rents are 
distributed in proportion to trade flows.  
 
4. NEGOTIATING  MODALITIES  AND SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
March 2003 will remain an important date in the history of the ongoing 
agricultural negotiations. In that month, the Chairman of the WTO CoA, Mr 
Stuart Harbinson, released a draft negotiating modalities based on some 
modalities as well as many proposals by WTO members. But no agreement 
could be reached on the modalities by then, as well as in subsequent months, 
nor at the WTO Cancun Ministerial conference where revised versions were 
presented. The negotiations continue. 
As said at the beginning, although the main interest is with the Harbinson 
modalities, this paper also discusses simulated results of the EU and US 
modalities as alternative scenarios in view of the following reasons: i) these 
being among the few complete modalities; ii) the weights these two WTO 
Members carry in these negotiations; and iii) the fact that these represent to a 
 
12 The main reason for this assumption is that based on the recent implementation experience 
of the TRQs, many TRQs were found to be under-filled even when in-quota rates were 
lowered, suggesting that it was not in-quota rates but other factors that kept the TQRs 
under-filled. 
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large extent “modest” and “deeper” reforms, relative to the Harbinson text. 
The final modalities that would be agreed to one day could change, but most 
probably by not much.  
For space reason, the modalities are not described here in detail; this is also 
not necessary because these are available in public domain in the WTO and 
other web sites. Rather, in what follows, the three scenarios are presented 
briefly. An important point to note here is that not all parameters or proposals 
in the respective modalities can be quantitatively analysed with any model, 
including the ATPSM. The three scenarios simulated are summarized in Box 
1. The parameters listed in the box, therefore, represent only those elements 
that are amenable for quantitative analysis with the ATPSM. Several other 
elements of the reform package could be important but can not be modelled, 
e.g. rules on TRQ administration, state trading enterprises, non-direct forms of 
export subsidies, Green Box Measures, “non-trade” concerns, and so on. 
Nevertheless, the scenarios simulated cover in general most of the important 
elements of the three proposals regarding the three pillars of trade liberalisation. 
Box 1:  Modalities parameters used in simulations 
Harbinson Modalities 
Tariff:  Developed countries - 3 band reduction formula 
 tariff > 90  reduction of  60% with a minimum 45% 
15 < tariff  90  reduction of  50% with a minimum 35%  ≤
 tariff <15  reduction of  40% with a minimum 25% 
 Developing countries - 4 band reduction formula 
 tariff >120  reduction  of 40% with a minimum 30% 
 60 < tariff ≤120  reduction of  35% with a minimum 25% 
20 < tariff  60  reduction of  30% with a minimum 20%  ≤
 tariff <20  reduction of 25% with a minimum 15% 
TRQ:  N o  c h a n g e  i n  i n - q u o t a  r a t e s ;  e x p a n d  T R Q  u p  t o  1 0 %  o f  c u r r e n t  d o m e s t i c  
consumption for developed countries and 6.6% for developing countries; LDC 
are exempted. 
Domestic support: 60% cut in Amber Box for developed countries; 40% for developing countries; 
no reduction for LDC. 
Export subsidies: Eliminate 
US Proposal 
Tariff:  Swiss formula with parameter 25 on applied tariffs 
TRQ:  No cuts in in-quota rates, 20% expansion of TRQ volumes 
Domestic support: Reduce to 5% of the value of agricultural production 
Export subsidies: Eliminate 
EU Proposal 
Tariff:  15% minimum cut, 36% reduction on average 
TRQ:  No cuts in in-quota rates; no expansion of TRQ volumes 
 LDC:  Duty and quota free access for LDC 
Domestic support: 55% cut in Amber Box (2/3rd of this level for developing countries; no cut for 
LDC) 
Export subsidies:  45% reduction  (2/3rd for developing countries and LDC) 
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4.1 Market  access 
 
The key US proposal on tariff was the use of a harmonization formula that 
would reduce higher tariffs more deeply than lower tariffs. For this, the Swiss 
formula was proposed, with a parameter of 2513. This means that all tariffs are 
reduced to below 25%. The other key proposal was to apply the formula to 
applied tariffs. The EU proposal was for the continuation of the UR approach, 
i.e. 36% average reduction of bound rates with a minimum 15% cut for each 
tariff line. The Harbinson draft proposed different reduction rates for 
developed and developing countries depending on the level of the initial tariff 
(see Box 1). This proposal also leads to harmonization of tariffs to some extent 
because higher rates are reduced proportionately more than lower rates. It 
also has the average-minimum feature of the EU proposal. The US proposal 
does not say anything about special and differential treatment for developing 
countries. It is important to note that the EU scenario includes its duty-free 
and quota-free preferential access package for LDC, called “Everything but 
Arms”. 
 
As regards TRQs, the Harbinson proposal called for expanding volumes up to 
10% of current domestic consumption (6.6% for developing countries). Some 
proposals have been made for in-quota tariff also. The US proposed 
elimination of the in-quota rate and a 20% expansion of the TRQ volumes. The 
EU modalities did not propose any increase in the TRQ volume.  
 
4.2 Domestic  support 
 
The US proposal is for the reduction of total non-exempt domestic support 
(which includes in the US definition both Amber and Blue Boxes) to at most 
5% of the average value of agricultural production in the base period 1996-98, 
to be implemented over a five year period. It further proposed for maintaining 
the current de minimis threshold (5% of the value of agricultural production). 
The EU proposed maintaining all the three Boxes (amber, blue and green) and 
called for reducing the Amber Box or Total AMS by 55%, and eliminating the 
de minimis provision for developed countries. Harbinson’s proposal is for 
reducing the AMS by 60% over 5 years for developed countries and by 40% 
over ten years for developing countries. It also proposed reducing de minimis 




13 The Swiss formula with parameter 25 is: Tnew = (25*Told)/(25+Told), where T is tariff rate. 
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4.3 Export  subsidies 
 
The US proposal is for complete elimination of export subsidies over a five 
year period. Export taxes are to be phased out in developed countries and if 
export tax is used in a developing country, it should be applied uniformly 
across all agricultural commodities. The EU proposed a “substantial” but 
unspecified cut in the volume of subsidized exports and 45% reduction in 
subsidy outlays. Harbinson’s proposal is to reduce export subsidies using the 
following formulae: 
Budgetary outlay, Bj = Bj-1 – C*Bj-1  
Volumes subsidized,  Qj = Qj-1 – C*Qj-1,  
 
where j is the implementation year. The value of the C is 0.3 for developed 
countries (to be reduced over a five year period and then eliminated) and 0.25 
for developing countries (reduced over 10 years and eliminated in 11th).  
 
The ATPSM is designed for simulating the effects of the Swiss formula, and so 
this is not an issue. There are, however, some areas where incorporating the 
scenario parameters is not as simple. For example, simulating tariff reductions 
in the Harbinson proposal requires first the grouping of commodities into the 
three and four tariff bands. Even then, it is not possible to implement the 
“minimum-average” reduction rule, because it cannot be known in advance 
how individual countries will select tariff lines for the minimum reduction. 
This limitation also applies to the EU proposal. In the case of export subsidies, 
the EU proposal merely says a “substantial” reduction in export volumes 
without specifying the exact number. In the simulation, the same 45% as for 
budgetary outlay is assumed for quantities also. Finally, additional work was 
needed to incorporate the duty-free and quota-free market access for LDC in 
the EU scenario. 
 
5. SIMULATION  RESULTS 
 
This section reports assessments of the likely impacts of the three scenarios. 
Most of the main results are expressed as volume and percentage changes 
from the base levels. Before reviewing the results, it would be useful to note 
the commonly stated sceptism about model-based results. The sceptics argue 
that global trade models often give different assessments, and messages, at 
times widely different for even seemingly similar reform. This is true to some 
extent, but not entirely so. For example, most studies of this type point to the 
same direction for changes in world market prices, at times even to similar 
magnitudes, e.g. the impact on temperate-zone food products versus those on 
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tropical products. But differences do also occur. There are several reasons for 
this, which are worth noting in reviewing the results (Sharma et al, 1996). For 
example, models differ with respect to structure, specification and parameters. 
Models also differ greatly in terms of aggregation, both of countries and 
commodities, which tend to cancel out some effects that would be evident in 
more disaggregated models. The elements of a reform package simulated 
could also be different, and even weights attached to particular instruments 
could vary. Nevertheless, there is no alternative to model-based assessments.  
  
5.1  Impact on world market prices 
In global trade models, it is the change in world market prices that drives 
other results, and so this would have to be the starting point. Table 1 shows 
the impact on world market prices. There are three main messages here. First, 
on the whole, the impact is large on most temperate-zone commodities such 
as beef, sheep meat, dairy products, sugar, wheat and vegetable oils, in all 
three scenarios. This was expected, as these are the commodities receiving 
high levels of protection and support. Other studies do also point to similar 
impacts. For example, the USDA study (Diao et al, 2001) showed large 
increases in world prices under full policy reform (18% for wheat, 15% for 
other grains, 22% for butter and 12% for beef). The impact was small (e.g. 3.4 
and 1.4% for wheat and other grains) under slight reductions in domestic 
support and tariffs. The results of Diao et al’s full policy reform scenario are 
closer to those under the US scenario in this paper. Similar effects were found 
in a recent FAPRI study analysing the impact of the Doha Round reforms 
(FAPRI 2002). By contrast, the impact on tropical product prices was modest, 
also expected. 
Second, looking at the results across the three scenarios, the impact is most 
pronounced under the US scenario, also expected in view of the sharp 
reductions in (applied) tariffs in particular but also heavy reduction of 
domestic support and elimination of exports subsidies. These price rises are 
on average twice the levels under the EU proposal, while those under the 
Harbinson proposal lie in between the two scenarios. There are some cases 
where this pattern does not hold strictly. 
Third, it is already possible to guess, based on the price changes, the direction 
of the impact on some of the national level indicators, like trade and welfare. 
Thus, the change in the terms of trade would be unfavourable for many 
developing countries that import basic foods and export tropical products.  
Evaluating the impact of the three main elements – tariff reductions and 
domestic and export subsidy cuts – separately, it was found that though all 
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the elements of the reform package contribute to the price change, but tariffs 
play a dominant role, especially the sharp reduction for developing countries 
under the US scenario. 
 
5.2  Impact on total welfare 
As explained in Section 3, total welfare or surplus (TS) in the ATPSM is the 
sum of producer and consumer surpluses (PS and CS respectively) and 
change net government revenue (NGR). This sub-section summarizes the 
overall impact of trade liberalization on SADC countries in terms of the TS; 
the impact on the three components of the TS is discussed separately in some 
detail below. Table 2 shows the results for TS. 
Table 1:  Impact on world market prices (%change from base levels) 
Commodities Harbinson  Proposal  US Proposal  EU Proposal 
Bovine meat  6  7.8  3.2 
Sheep meat  6  9.6  4.2 
Pig meat  2.6  3.4  1.8 
Poultry 2.5  5.8  1.9 
Milk, fresh  6  10.3  4.4 
Milk, conc.  13.7  18.1  7 
Butter 20.2  24.3  10.6 
Cheese 13  16  7.3 
Wheat 10.8  11.9  5.4 
Rice 1.6  2.5  1 
Barley 1.5  2.8  0.8 
Maize 2.7  4.4  1.6 
Sorghum 0.6  0.8  0.3 
Pulses 2.7  3.2  0.7 
Tomatoes 2.1  3.1  1.6 
Roots & tubers  0.9  3.5  1 
Apples 2.3  3.6  1.9 
Citrus fruits  1.1  1.5  0.8 
Bananas 0.9  1.2  0.7 
Other tropical fruits  2.3  2.5  1.1 
Sugar 4.7  9.2  3.3 
Coffee green   0.8  1.2  0.5 
Coffee roasted  0.3  0.5  0.2 
Coffee extracts  3.7  6.8  0.3 
Cocoa beans  0.2  0.3  0.1 
Cocoa powder  1  1.3  0.7 
Cocoa butter  0.7  0.5  0.7 
Chocolate 4.7  6.1  3.4 
Oilseeds 1  1.2  0.8 
Cotton lint  1.4  1.5  0.8 
Vegetable oils  3.4  7.2  1.3 
Source: Simulation results 
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The outcomes under the Harbinson, EU and US scenarios are similar in terms 
of the direction of change (positive or negative) but the magnitudes differ 
significantly. For the former two scenarios, all SADC countries are seen losing 
in TS term with the exception of Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia. The loss in 
TS is the result of the sum of the losses in CS and government revenues 
exceeding the PS gain.  
SADC as a group incurred TS losses under all three scenarios, the most ($180 
million) under the Harbinson proposal. About 50% of the total loss was 
accounted for by just two countries, South Africa and Mauritius. All three 
NFIDC (Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia) also incurred welfare losses 
under all three scenarios. Finally, SACU as a group incurred TS losses under 
the Harbinson proposal while recording small positive TS gains under the 
other two scenarios. 
One interesting result is that all LDC (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia) show TS gains under the US proposal. This was so because even the 
LDC is required to cut tariffs under this proposal, which results into 
significant CS gains. As lower tariffs offset more than the higher world prices. 
By contrast, the CS was negative under Harbinson proposal, as tariff cuts did 
not offset the effect of higher world prices. 
Table 2:  Impact on total welfare for SADC countries (millions US$)1
Countries  Harbinson Proposal  US Proposal  EU Proposal 
Botswana -18  -32  -14 
Lesotho -10  10  -7 
Malawi 2  14  19 
Mauritius -66  -94  -50 
Mozambique -11  3  -6 
Namibia -11  -21  -10 
South Africa  -39  19  -25 
Swaziland 5  15  5 
Tanzania -10  -1  8 
Zambia #  4  2 
Zimbabwe -22  -20  -18 
SADC -180  -103  -96 
Note: 1Results are not shown for Congo DR, Seychelles and Angola. 
Source: Simulation results. A # means less than one million. 
 
Overall, six countries had welfare gains under the US proposal, but only four 
and three under the EU and Harbinson proposals respectively. In other 
words, the Harbinson proposal resulted into the highest number of losers (8 
countries out of 11), although the magnitude of the loss itself is small as PS 
and CS changes typically cancel out.  
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5.3  Consumer and producer surpluses  
 
These are useful welfare indicators on their own; they are also interesting 
from the standpoint of the political economy. Governments often attach 
different importance to these gains. In general, PS gains seem to be preferred 
in practice by trade negotiators and agricultural officials alike. Although 
agriculture is at times found to be taxed, many developing country policy 
makers would like to support the sector in view of its importance for 
economic growth and poverty reduction.  
 
Table 3 shows estimated PS and CS values for the three scenarios.  As a group, 
SADC loses in CS term in the case of Harbinson and EU proposals, with the 
loss much larger than the PS gains. The losses in CS and PS differ across 
countries and scenarios. Under the Harbinson proposal, only Botswana and 
Swaziland had CS gains – as their high tariffs get reduced significantly which 
offset the effect of higher world prices. By contrast, the LDC loses on account 
of the CS for the same reason as said earlier, i.e., as they did not reduce tariffs, 
domestic prices rose with world prices. Also, countries that benefited 
significantly in the base period from preferential market access experienced 
PS losses as support and protection in developed country markets fell. This 
effect is much pronounced under the US proposal that called for sharp cuts in 
domestic subsidies. The results for Botswana and Mauritius show this effect 
more clearly.  
 
Table 3:  Changes in consumer and producer surpluses (million US$) 
 
Harbinson Proposal  US Proposal  EU Proposal 












Botswana  13 -18  42 -34  12  -15 
Lesotho  -19 12 40  -19  -14 8 
Malawi  -24 26  -47 62  -19  38 
Mauritius  -17 -49  8 -89  -6  -49 
Mozambique -36  27  121  -119  -31  26 
Namibia  -3 -6 -1  -12 -2  -7 
South Africa  -202  137  16  3  -224  209 
Swaziland  8 4  32 5 7  3 
Tanzania  -99 91  -11 21  -72  82 
Zambia  -20 20 12 -8  -15  17 
Zimbabwe  -40 23  -15 29  -31  16 
SADC  -439 267 197  -161  -395  328 
Source:  Simulation results. 
 
There is an outlier to this pattern – many more countries seem to lose in PS 
term in the US scenario, and significantly so. This is due to the elimination of 
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preferential trade agreement. But countries which do not have a higher 
volume of trade under preferential agreement showed a gain in PS, such as 
Tanzania and Malawi as producers received higher prices for their products. 
The reason for the PS loss for others, as noted before, is that in the US scenario 
the LDC also reduce tariffs and so farm prices in the domestic market decline. 
By contrast, in the other two scenarios, although tariffs decline, these were not 
deep enough to lower domestic prices, given the increased world prices. Thus, 
overall, if SADC countries as a group were to place greater importance on the PS 
gain, the US proposal appears less attractive followed by the Harbinson package. 
 
In summary, two points may be noted. First, the results show different gains 
and loses from the three proposals, at times markedly so, and mostly in the 
opposite direction. This is useful information for trade negotiators and policy 
makers, as they often attach different weights to the two sources of welfare 
gains. Second, the results raise the issue of compensation, which is well 
known in welfare economics but not as intuitive in practice. There are two 
dimensions to it. One is compensating winners and losers within a country 
(e.g. between the PS and CS gainers and losers). Given the results, it is clear 
that governments need to take into account the issue of social costs to 
particular population groups during the reform process. The other is 
international dimension, i.e., those countries that gain will have to 
compensate those who lose. This could be an area worth pursuing within the 
WTO framework.  
 
5.4  Government revenue  
 
In the ATPSM, changes in government revenues result from changes in tariff 
revenues, outlays on domestic and export subsidies and the part of the quota 
rent not received by exporters. In the SADC, only South Africa has subsidy 
reduction commitments and so changes in tariff revenues account for most 
changes in government revenues. Reduced tariffs typically lower border 
revenues but could also raise them if imports expand. The simulation results 
show reduced government revenues in most cases under all three scenarios 
(Table 4). The reduction is most marked under the US scenario as tariff rates 
fall to very low levels. At the same time, imports decline due to higher world 
market prices. Under the Harrbinson and EU proposals, by contrast, tariffs do 
not decline as much.  
 
These results show the possibility of significant negative effects that many 
SADC countries have been expressing as a matter of concern for them in the 
context of trade liberalization. 
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Table 4:  The impact on government revenue (million US$) 
Country  Harbinson Proposal  US Proposal  EU Proposal 
Botswana -13  -40  -11 
Lesotho -3  -11  -1 
Malawi -#  -1  0 
Mauritius -#  -13  2 
Mozambique -1 1  -1 
Namibia -2  -7  -1 
South Africa  26  #  -10 
Swaziland -7  -22  -5 
Tanzania -2  -11  -1 
Zambia #  1  0 
Zimbabwe -5  -34  -3 
SADC  -7 -137 -31 
Source:  Simulation results. A # means less one million. 
 
Faced with these prospects, they are often advised to diversify into other 
forms of taxation. But this is often more simple said than done if 
administrative and others costs involved in raising these taxes are taken into 
account. The simulation results show that this aspect needs to be considered 
while assessing the overall impact of trade liberalization. 
 
5.5  Impact on export earnings, import cost and trade balance 
 
In the model, the two key factors that determine changes in export earnings 
and import bills, following a policy reform, are changes in world market 
prices and tariffs, which influence trade flows. Although all countries face the 
same world prices, the impact on a particular country depends on changes on 
own tariffs and to the composition of exports and imports. First, in all three 
scenarios, world food prices rise relatively strongly than tropical product 
prices, which impact negatively on net trade balance of countries that import 
food and export tropical products. Second, domestic prices that consumers 
face will decline, or not increase by as much, where a country reduces its own 
tariffs, which pushes up import bills. This was the case under the US scenario 
where the simulated net trade balance (export minus import) for SADC as a 
whole was smallest (Table 5). Under the other two proposals, by contrast, 
import bills rise only modestly as consumption, and hence import, did not 




                                                 
14 This is also reflected in terms of significant consumer surplus losses under the Harbinson 
and EU proposals in Table 3. 
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Table 5:  Impact on export revenues, import costs and trade balance (billion US$) 
Countries 
Change in export 
revenue 
(a) 
Change in import 
bill 
(b) 




Botswana 9  8  1 
Lesotho #  -2  2 
Malawi 24  1  23 
Mauritius 9  5  4 
Mozambique 12  -6  17 
Namibia 18  3  14 
South Africa  132  117  15 
Swaziland 16  5  10 
Tanzania 57  -13  70 
Zambia 13  -2  16 
Zimbabwe 50  6  44 
SADC 340  122  218 
US proposal 
Botswana 12  18  -6 
Lesotho 1  65  -64 
Malawi 55  1  53 
Mauritius 16  18  -2 
Mozambique 8  88  -80 
Namibia 26  5  20 
South Africa  241  109  135 
Swaziland 34  13  22 
Tanzania 61  57  4 
Zambia 9  17  -8 
Zimbabwe 91  11  79 
SADC 554  402  153 
EU Proposal 
Botswana 5  6  -1 
Lesotho #  -1  1 
Malawi 20  -1  21 
Mauritius 6  4  1 
Mozambique 9  -4  13 
Namibia 10  2  9 
South Africa  105  -67  173 
Swaziland 13  4  9 
Tanzania 39  -7  46 
Zambia 8  -2  10 
Zimbabwe 37  -9  45 
SADC 252  -75  327 
Source: Simulation results. A # means less one million. 
 
6. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
The paper analysed the likely impact on the SADC economies of the draft 
Harbinson modalities under the Doha agricultural negotiations, along with 
the US and EU modalities as alternative scenarios. The impact was assessed 
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for a number of indicators. Several results are standard and relatively 
straightforward to explain. Thus, further trade liberalization raises world 
prices of farm products, much more so for temperate-zone products that 
received high support and protection in the base period than for tropical 
products. World price increases are more pronounced under the US scenario 
than the other two, reflecting deeper reforms.  
 
Many of the outcomes are determined by how domestic market prices change 
following policy reforms. These prices are determined by two factors: the 
extent of the change in world prices, which applies to all countries similarly; 
and the depths of tariff cuts, which are specific to modalities, countries and 
commodities. For this reason, different scenarios could lead to different 
outcomes. For example, where import tariffs are not reduced (as for LDC in 
the EU and Harbinson proposals), or reduced relatively modestly (as in these 
two proposals, relative to the US proposal), domestic prices rise, or do not 
decline much, following the same changes in world prices. These lead to loses 
for consumers and gains for produces. By contrast, where tariffs are lowered 
markedly, as in the US scenario, there are widespread consumer gains while 
producers lose. Government revenues and trade flows are also affected by 
these changes.  
 
Thus there are important trade-offs involved, and modalities may be “ranked” 
differently based on the indicator used. Table 6 summarizes these rankings 
based on net gains for SADC as a whole. For example, the EU scenario results 
into highest gains in terms of total welfare, producer gains and trade balance. 
Very often, published impact studies report only one or other indicator, the 
typical ones being total welfare and trade flow. While economists tend to like 
the former indicator, trade negotiators seem to be more interested in trade 
flow. This study demonstrates the value of considering a range of impact 
indicators and the trade-offs involved. Hopefully, this will be appreciated by 
both economists and trade negotiators. 
 
Table 6:  Ranking of the three modalities according to indicators (ranking 
based on net gains to SADC as a group) 
Indicators  First rank  Second rank  Third rank 
Total welfare  EU  US  Harbinson 
Consumer surplus  US  EU  Harbinson 
Producer surplus   EU  Harbinson  US 
Govt. revenue  Harbinson  EU  US 
Trade balance (X-M)  EU  Harbinson  US 
Source: Based on assessed gains and losses as reported in various tables in Section 5.  
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Finally, this paper raises an issue for further debate. The question is what does 
it really mean in practice, for lower-income economies with large populations 
dependent on agriculture, to gain in CS and at the same time to lose in PS.  
One consideration is that in models where incomes are not generated 
endogenously (as in ATPSM), or not injected exogenously, it is not clear if the 
estimated CS gains are realized effectively (i.e. “effectively demanded”) 
because in such economies farm production itself is a major source of income 
and so PS loss could also imply income loss for consumers (the simulations 
show that the CS gains invariably show up with PS losses). Moreover, since 
agricultural development would require PS gains on a sustained basis, it would 
seem that PS gains are much more valuable than CS gains in those economies. 
If this is so, assessments based on total welfare could also be misleading 
because this indicator attaches equal importance to both the surpluses (i.e. one 
dollar of PS gain is valued the same as one dollar of CS gain). Thus, it makes 
sense for policy makers in such economies in particular to review the impact of 
policy reforms on both surpluses, and of course other indicators too. 
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